Do ransomware creators genuinely hold decryption keys for infected systems, or is it sometimes a bluff?

Why might antivirus software mistakenly flag Steam or other legitimate programs as ransomware, and how can such false positives be resolved?

How does ransomware encrypt files securely without exposing the decryption key to the victim?

What might have happened to REvil, the ransomware gang that disappeared abruptly from the web, and how does this affect their victims?

What preventative measures can organizations take to avoid the need for ransomware recovery entirely?

What solutions are available when all files on a computer are locked by ransomware, leaving victims confused about recovery steps?

Should CIOs or CTOs face consequences after ransomware attacks, or be rewarded for quick resolutions that minimize organizational damage?

Why do ransomware groups use master keys for decryption, and doesn’t this create a critical point of failure?

How do you recover data if ransomware changes file extensions, such as “.COPA,” and decryption tools are not readily available?